WHITHEAD vs. KEYES.

In the Atassachusetts Supreme Judicial ourt---Ian. Term, 1862.
WHITHEAD VS.

KEYES.

No exception lies to the decision of a judge of the superior court upon the question
whether a deposition which has been read in evidence in a trial shall be
delivered to the jury when they retire to consider of their verdict.
In an action against a sheriff for an escape suffered by his deputy, the return of a
rescue upon the writ is not conclusive evidence in favor of the defendant.
An officer is not bound to call for aid in the service of mesne process, and is not
liable for an escape that might have been prevented by his calling for aid.
An officer is bound to use all reasonable and proper personal exertions to secure a
person for whose arrest he has a writ; and if, in the opinion of the jury, he has
not done so, he may be held liable for an escape, although he used all such
exertions as he deemed necessary at the time.
An officer effects an arrest by laying his hand upon a person whom he has
authority to arrest, for the purpose of arresting him, although he may not succeed in stopping or holding him.

Tort against the sheriff of Middlesex county, for the default
of his deputy.
The facts which appeared at the second trial in the superior
court were substantially the same as those which appeared at
the first trial, reported in 1 Allen, 350. The objection heretofore
taken, that the present action could not be maintained, because
the plaintiff did not enter his action against Stoddard, the defendant in the original writ, was renewed ; but Putnam, J., overruled
it. The deputy returned a rescue upon the writ, and the defendant contended that this return was conclusive, but the judge ruled
that it was not conclusive, but was evidence for the consideration
of the jury.
The judge also ruled, against the defendant's objections, that
certain depositions which had been read in evidence by the defendant should not be delivered to the jury when they retired to consider of their'verdict.
The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that the
officer, although he might call for aid in arresting Stoddard, the
defendant in the writ, was not bound to do so. The judge declined
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so to rule, and instructed the jury that the officer had the power
to call for aid, and it was for them to determine whether, under
the peculiar circumstances of the case, he ought not to have done
so, and whether if he had done so he could have succeeded in
detaining Stoddard, and whether or not it showed negligence in
not calling for aid.
The defendant also requested the court to instruct the jury that
he would not be liable for an escape provided the officer used all
such reasonable and proper exertions as he deemed necessary to
secure Stoddard. The judge declined so to rule, and instructed
the jury that the defendant would not be liable provided the deputy
used all such exertions as they should consider reasonable and
proper under all the circumstances of the case.
The defendant also requested the court to instruct the jury that
if the hold taken of Stoddard by the officer was only for an instant,
and Stoddard broke away from that hold by superior force, or was
rescued therefrom by the interference of others, this would be a
sufficient retaking by the officer to allow him to return a rescue.
The judge declined so to rule, and instructed the jury that to enable
the defendant to set up a re-arrest of Stoddard by the officer, the
hold by the officer would not be sufficient unless Stoddard was held
and stopped, or the officer had such a hold of him that it was in
his power to stop him.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant
alleged exceptions.
.D. S. Bichardson and S. A. Brown, for the defendant.
T. Hf. Sweetser and A. F. L. Norris, for the plaintiff.
METCALF, J.-1. When this case was formerly before the court,
(1 Allen, 350), we decided that the averment, in the declaration,
that the writ against Stoddard was returnable to the Court of Common Pleas, " as by the record of the same writ, in the same court
remaining, more fully appears," was supported by proof that the
writ was returned to the' clerk's office and placed in the files of
non-entries. So the reporter understood and stated the decision,
as he was authorized by the fact that the point was argued, with
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other points, and that the court granted a new trial -upon a single
ground," namely, an erroneous instruction given to the jury as to
the defendant's liability for an escape ; thereby, by necessary implication, overruling the exception which is now brought again
before the court. A writ, when returned, is matter of record.
1 Stark Ev. (4th Amer. ed.) 285. Powell on Ev. 293. 1 Greenl.
Ev. § 521.
2. It is not a matter of right that depositions used in the trial
of a cause shall be delivered to the jury, on their retiring to consider of their verdict. It is matter of discretion, the exercise of
which by a judge is not a legal ground of exception. See Graham
on New Trials, 80; Spence v. Spence, 4 Watts, 168; Alexander
v. Jameson, 5 Binn. 238.
3. We are. of opinion that the judge correctly ruled that the
return of Thomas, on the writ against Stoddard, was not conclusive
in this action against the defendant for an escape. The defendant
relies on the position, often found in the books, that an officer's
return cannot be contradicted by parties and privies, except in an
action against him for a false return. But we cannot see, on principle, any more reason why his return should be conclusive in this
action for an escape-which assumes that the return was falsethan in an action directly charging him with a false return. If his
return be true, he may prove it to be so, as well in this action as
in the other. His return is prima facie evidence of a rescue, and
the burden is on the plaintiff to prove it false, as well in this action
as in the other. And not one of the numerous books cited by
the defendant's counsel, nor any case in any English book, shows
that an officer's return of a rescue has ever been decided to be conclusive evidence in his favor in an action brought against him for
an escape. On the contrary, there are recent English authorities
which show that it is not conclusive. It was so decided by Holroyd, J., in Adey vs. Bridges, 2 Stark. R. 189. In Jackson vs.
Hill, 10 Ad. & El. 492, Patteson, J., denied that a return was
conclusive in all cases except in an action for a false return, and
said : - The case cited from the Year Book" (5 Edw. IV. 1) "is
strong to show that a return is conclusive only in the particular
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cause in which it is made; and there is no authority the other
way." See also Vin. Ab. Return, 0. 25; 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev.
(2d ed.) 1074; Atkinson's Sheriff Law, 247, 248. Watson's
Sheriff, 72. 3 Phil. Ev. (4th Amer. ed.) 701. 1 Taylor on Ev.
702, 703.
If there are any decisions in this country which support the
defendant's exception to the ruling on this point, we cannot follow
them. We adopt the views of the Supreme Court of Vermont, in
the case of Barrett vs. Copeland, 18 Verm. 67, which cannot be
distinguished, in principle, from the case before us. That was an
action for an assault and battery and false imprisonment at B. The
defendant pleaded, in justification, that he was a constable of the
town of M. ; that he arrested the plaintiff at M. on an execution;
that the plaintiff escaped, and that he pursued and recaptured him
in the town of B. and conveyed him to Al. on the way to prison.
On the trial in the county court, the defendant' gave in evidence
the execution and his return thereon, in which he set forth an
arrest of the plaintiff at M. as averred in the plea. The plaintiff
offered evidence to contradict the return, but it was excluded, and
the defendant obtained a verdict, on which judgment was rendered.
The supreme court reversed that judgment. " The question," said
Royce, J., " now presented is, whether the official return of a
public officer is conclusive evidence in favor of such officer, in the
prosecution or defence of a collateral action. We find it laid down
as undoubted law, that such a return is admissible evidence in the
officer's favor; as also to affect the rights of third persons. But
these authorities uniformly assert, that when offered for such a
purpose, it is but prima facie evidence. Its admissibility is. put
upon the ground of the general credit due to the return of such
an officer, in cases where it is his duty to make a return. But,
upon principle, it should be subject to contradiction by third persons, because they are neither parties nor privies to the transaction,
and because they would not, according to any precedent with
which I am acquainted, be entitled to a remedy against the officer
for a false return. It should also be open to contradiction collaterally, even by a party to the process. We are therefore of
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opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to go into evidence to disprove the alleged arrest at M. And for the rejection of the evidence, offered for that purpose, the judgment of the county court
must be reversed." See also Francisvs. Wood, 28 Maine, 69.
4. But we are of opinion that the jury were wrongly instructed
that they were to determine whether Thomas ought noti under the
particular circumstances of the case, to have called for aid in
arresting Stoddard, and whether, if he had done so, he would not
have secured him, and whether his omission to call for aid showed
negligence on his part. Though an officer has authority, yet he
is not bound, to call for aid in the service of mesne process, and is
not liable for an escape that might have been prevented by his
calling for aid, if the party arrested by him rescues himself or is
rescued by others. May vs. Proby, 3 Bulst. 200, 1 Rol. R. 388,
440, and Oro. Jac. 419. Watson's Sheriff, 60. Griffin vs. Brown,
2 Pick. 304, 310. Buckminster vs. Applebee, 8 N. H. 547. Sutton vs. Allison, 2 Jones Law R. (N. C.) 341.
5. We are of opinion that, as to all things except the duty of
Thomas to call for aid in the service of the process in his hands,
the jury were rightly instructed that it was for them to decide
whether Thomas used all reasonable and proper exertions to secure
Stoddard, and that this question was not to be decided by the
opinion and judgment of Thomas, at the time. But, for the reason
already given, the instruction was erroneous, so far as it left the
jury at liberty to decide whether Thomas, by not calling for aid,
omitted a necessary and proper exertion to secure Stoddard.
6. We are also of opinion that the jury were wrongly instructed
that to enable the defendant to set up a re-arrest of the debtor
(Stoddard) by the officer (Thomas) the hold of the debtor by the
officer would not be sufficient, unless the debtor was held and
stopped, or the officer had such a hold of him, that it was in his
power to stop him.
There cannot be either an escape or a rescue of a person, unless
he is first arrested. If an arrest is prevented by a party's avoidance or resistance of an officer, or by the interference of others,
the party does not escape, and the officer is not liable in an
iction for an escape, but is liable, if at all, in an action for negli-
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gence in not making an arrest when he might and ought. And
the law is the same in regard to a rescue. An officer cannot
legally return a rescue of a party whom he had not arrested.
Such a return would be false. We have therefore,. in deciding
on this last instruction given to the jury, to consider the question
-what constitutes an arrest? And our opinion is, that an officer
effects an arrest of a person whom he has authority .o arrest, by
laying his hand on him for the purpose of arresting him, though
he may not succeed in stopping and holding him. 1 Hale P. 0.
459. Genner vs.. Sparks, 6 Mod. 173, and 1 Salk. 79. Sheriff
of Hampshire vs. Godfrey, 7 Mod. (Leach's ed.) 289. Williams vs.
Jones, Rep. Temp. Hardw. 301. Bul. N. P. 62. Watson's Sheriff,
90. United States vs. Benner, Bald. 239. And we need not express an opinion as to what else will or will not amount to an
arrest. We think that the instruction, prayed for on this point,
by the defendant, should have been granted, and that the exception taken to the instruction that was given must be sustained.
New trial granted.
1. The law of arrest, which seems simple, has been, first and last, a good deal
debated, and the decisions upon the subject are not altogetherharmonious. Inregard to the firstpoint decided by this case,
there seems no good ground of question.
To hold the return of the officer primD,
facie evidence of the truth of the facts
contained therein, is nothing more than
giving him the advantage of that presumption which every public officer is
entitled to claim in his favor, that he has
performed his duty, until the contrary
is shown. And to ask any further immunity, as that his return shall be held
conclusive between the parties, would
lead practically to the absurdity, that an
officer could not be made liable even for
a false.return, which is carrying the matter further than has ever been done, so
far as we know. The return of an officer
has been held conclusive of the facts
stated therein, so far as the particular
action is concerned, in many of the Ame-

rican states, and not liable to be contradicted by a plea in abatement. But
this is a rule of convenience merely, and
tolerable only upon the ground that the
officer is liable to either party for all
damages sustained in consequence of
any false return made by him, by an
action founded directly upon the malfeasance.
2. In regard to the re-arrest, the case
is quite susceptible of the view taken in
Cooper vs. Adams, 2 Blackf. 294, -that
the arresting of a prisoner and the retaking him on fresh pursuit, after an escape,
make but one effective arrest." But, in
considering the recaption it is certain
nothing more is required than what was
necessary to constitute an arrest in the
first instance. And this consists chiefly
in having the proper authority, and in
properly asserting it, when the prisoner
is within the power of the officer. After
this the defendant is bound to submit,
and if he will not, but forcibly break
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away, it is one form of rescue, and may
be so returned.
As is said by Holt, Ch. J., in Atwood vs. Burr, 7 Mod. 3, 8, "If a window
be open, and a bailiff put in his hand
and touches one for whom he has a warrant, he is thereby his prisoner." But
if the person is never in the power of the
officer, it is not an arrest, even if he
touch him, as he might do, when not in
a situation to control his movements.
As if he said to one on horseback or in
a coach, "You are my prisoner," and
even touch some part of his person, if
lie nevertheless drive off, it is no arrest,
for he was not in his power. But if the
person thus approached do submit himself to the power of the officer, it is a
good arrest. Homer vs. Battyn, 12 Geo.
2; B. N. P. 62; 1 Ventris, 306.
But it is certainly not regarded as
requisite, at the present day, that the
officer should touch the person to constitute an arrest, as asserted in Genner vs.
Sparkes, 1 Salk. R. 79; S.C. 6 Mod. 173.
This doctrine is reiterated by Woonnuny, J., in Huntington vs. Blaidsell, 2
New H. R. 318, as still being sound
law. But this view is abandoned in most
of the modern cases. United States vs.
Benner, 1 Bald. R. 234; Gold vs. Bissell, 1 Wend. R. 215. Some such view
as this seems to be upheld in Hollister vs.
Goodale, 8 Conn. R. 332, but that case
is denied to be law even in regard to
the attachment of personal property.
Lyon vs. Rood, 12 Vt. R. 233, and cases
cited; and it is certain no such rule
could be maintained, either in regard
to the arrest of the person or the attachment of personal property.
In the important and leading case of
Blatch vs. Archer, 1 Cowp. R. 63, it was
held that a mere servant of the bailiff
might make a good arrest, although
thirty rods away from the bailiff and
not within the view of such officer. But

both the officer and his assistant must
be then occupied in the purpose and
pursuit of such arrest. It will not do
for a stranger, or the party even, to take
a person and carry him by force, where
the officer can be found. Hall vs. Roche,
8 T. R. 187; Wilson vs. Gary, 6 Mod.
211.
The cases which have questioned the
legality of an arrest, where the party
was put under no physical restraint, but,
upon being informed that the officer had
a capias, submitted to his control, are
certainly not defensible. Arrowsmi th
vs. Le Mesurier, 5 B. & P. 211. It is
true, no doubt, that if the person resist,
and is never in the power of the officer,
that is, where, if he had strength, lie
might have controlled him, it will not
constitute an arrest. As when the person, on being informed that the officer
had process against him, snatched up a
pitchfork and kept off the officer, threatening to kill him if he came nearer, and
thus retreated into his house, and shut
the door against the officer, it was held
no good arrest. Genner vs. Sparks, 6
Mod. R. 173. But, as is said by Lord
Hardwicke, in Williams vs. Jones, Cas.
temp. Hardw. 201, 2 Str. 1049, "If a
bailiff comes into a room and tells the
defendant he arrests him, and shuts the
door upon him, there is an arrest, for
he is in custody of the officer." And
the same is equally true if he is near
enough to the person to lay his hand
upon him and inform, or in any way
give him to understand that he has process and arrests him. It thereby becomes the duty of such person to submit
to his authority; and his forcibly going
at large is a rescue of himself, and, as
such, punishable by indictment. Sir
James Wingfield's Case, Cro. Car. 251,
who was fined £500, and his abettor.
£200, £180, and 500 marks each, for
such an offence.
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There can be no question that, in a
case like the present, it was the duty of
the person arrested to submit to the
control of the officer, even if nothing had
occurred before he took him by the wrist
in entering the cars. And his forcibly
breaking away from him and escaping
from the cars, was an obvious rescue of
himself, and properly returned as such.
The only doubt which can be fairly
raised in regard to the case, in our
view, is, whether the officer, having such
abundant opportunity to call to his aid
the bystanders, who, by express statute,
are required to assist in the arrest, he
should not have done so.
From the opinion of the judges of the
Court of Common Pleas, in Howden vs.
Standish, 6 Com. B. R. 504, it is evident
that the early cases, such as May vs. Proby, Cro. Jac. 419, 3 Bulstr. 198, 1 Roll. R.
888, and Crompton vs. Ward, 1 Strange,
429, wherein it is held, that if an officer
arrest a person -upon mesne process,
and he rescue himself, or his friends
rescue him, the officer is excused, are
understood to have had reference to
such cases as the officer might be called
upon to act in suddenly, and where he
could not readily have obtained aid.
This is the reason urged in the English
books, and in these early cases. The
distinction which has so long obtained
upon this point, between mesne and
final process, making the officer liable
in the former and not in the latter, i9
founded upon this presumption.
In the case of Howden vs. Standish,
supra, Rolfe, B., .who presided at the
trial, instructed the jury that when, as
in the present case, the officer was called
upon to execute mesne process of capias,
under circumstances likely to provoke
resistance on the part of the defendant
and his friends, it was his duty -to be
provided with a force sufficient to overcome any degree of resistance that might

be offered to the execution of the process,
and that, if necessary, it was his duty to
call upon the posse comitatus to assist him
in the theatre." That was a case whero
the officer had process against an actor,
whom the company had conspired to
defend against the arrest. The defendant while upon the stage was pointed out
to the officer, but he did not attempt to
arrest him. The full bench evidently
concurred with the opinion of Baron
Rolfe, but the case turned upon a point
in the pleadings.
In delivering the opinion of the full
court, Coltman, J., said, "The question
here is, whether he (the officer) is not
bound to provide such a force as will
enable him to effect a caption in spite
of every such resistance as he has reason
to anticipate ;" and after citing the early
cases, and commenting upon Crompton
vs. Ward, concludes: "The reasoning
of this case seems to establish the principle laid down by the learned judge
[Baron Rolfe], that the sheriff is bound
to provide such a force as will enable
him to effect his caption, in spite of any
resistance which he has reason to anticipate." And this is the case of mesne
process.
The judge then goes on to argue, that
allowing the sheriff to return a rescue on
mesne process is "an exceptional case,
being matter of indulgence to the sheriff,
who cannot always have the posse comitatus with him, in consequence of the possibility that he may be taken unawnres
and called upon to execute the writ when
he has no sufficient force ;" and, as the
learned judge argues, all the cases show
that this indulgence t0 the sheriff " ought
not to be extended," and that he is bound
to provide against "a resistance which
he had reason to anticipate, and with
reference to which he was not taken unawares." It seems to us that the reasoning of this case, which is the latest de.
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termination of the English courts in
regard to the point, so far as we have
been able to find, might have led to the
conclusion that, when the officer has at
his command all the assistance he could
desire or possibly need, he was at least,
as a careful and considerate officer, resolved to execute the process effectually,
bound to command such assistance as was
at his disposal. But the cases have not,

perhaps, gone this length; and in favor
of officers we certainly should be content to allow all indulgence consistent
with good faith, and the decision takes,
perhaps, the safer view upon this point,
and clearly so upon the main point involved. The case is one of considerable
interest to the profession.
I. F. R.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, -Eastern-District,Philadelphia, March, 1862.
JOHN 0. CLARK vs. JOHN L. MARTIN.
H. being the owner of two city lots, one a corner property, and the other adjoining
it, granted and conveyed the corner lot to D. and R. in fee; reserving a perpetual ground rent, upon the express condition that the grantees, their heirs and
assigns, should not erect any building upon the back part of the lot higher than
ten feet. H. at the time, and for some years afterwards, occupied the adjoining
property as his residence. By five several mesne conveyances all made subject
to the condition, the corner property became vested in M. in fee; H. having
some years prior to the conveyance to M. granted to the then owner permission
to raise his back building to the height of eleven feet, expressly stipulating that
such permission should not prejudice or impair the condition. H. died seised of
the adjoining property, and also of the rent reserved out of the corner lot. His
testamentary trustee granted and conveyed the adjoining property to C., no
mention being made in the deed of the restriction imposed on the corner property. M. subsequently by sundry mesne conveyances became the owner ofthe
rent reserved, which thus merged; and M. threatened to build in entire disregard of the restriction. C. filed a bill in equity to restrain him, and applied for
a special injunction which was refused; and M. went on and erected a three
story back building. Held, upon appeal from the decree of the court below,
refusing the injunction and dismissing the bill:
1. That although the clause imposing the restriction was a strict condition in law,
yet equity would only inquire into the substantial elements of the agreement,
and would enforce it for any party, for whose benefit it appeared to be intended.
2. That the duty of the defendant not to build in violation of the condition was
clear; and that this duty was not reserved as a mere personal obligation to H.
the original grantor, his heirs and assigns; nor for the benefit of the ground
rent; but that it was for the benefit of the adjoining property then owned by H. ;
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and created an obligation to the owner of that property, whoever lie m'ght be;
and equity would interfere to enforce and protect his right.
3. That a general plan of lots need not be shown; such a plan is only one means
of proof of the existence of the right and duty; and this may appear as well
from a plan of two lots, as of any greater number.
4. That the release of a part of a condition only operates as a release of the whole,
where forfeiture of the estate for a breach of the condition is demanded, equity
will enforce the condition in its modified form in favor of a party who asks only
compliance with the agreement.
5. That the defendant having built in violation of the condition, after bill filed, the
complainant was entitled to a decree of abatement without amending his bill.

Appeal by complainant from the decree of the Supreme Court
at Nisi Prius, dismissing his bill with costs.
The defendant, at the time the bill was filed, was the owner of a
"three-story brick messuage, with the one-story back building or
dining-room thereto attached," and lot at the southwest corner of
Eighth and Locust streets, in the City of Philadelphia, twenty-two
feet six inches front on Eighth street, and one hundred feet deep
on Locust street, to a ten feet wide alley. The complainant has
been since 1851, the owner of the dwelling-house and lot immediately adjoining to the south, and of the same front and depth.
.Both lots originally formed parts of a larger lot, which, prior to
1814, was owned by Alexander Henry. July 7, 1814, Henry conveyed the corner lot (now defendant's) to Charles Drosddorf and
Lewis Roberts, as tenants in common in fee (reserving thereout to
said Henry in fee, a yearly ground-rent of $225), "upon this
express condition, nevertheless, that the said C.- D. and L. R.,
their heirs or assigns, shall not build or erect, or permit or suffer
to be built or erected, on any part of the hereby granted lot of
ground, beyond the distance of sixty-five feet from the said Eighth
street, any buildings whatsoever, other than privies, milk or bathing houses, and walls or fences not exceeding the height of ten feet
from the level of the ground, nor erect any building whatever
between the dwelling-house to be erected fronting on said Eighth
street, and the aforesaid distance of sixty-five feet from the said
Eighth street, other than such as shall merely be for the accommodation of the said dwelling-house."
The ground-rent was redeemable at any time within seven years, by payment of $3,750.
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Henry died August, 1847, never having parted with said groundrent or the dwelling-house and lot adjoining the corner. In 1816,
Drosddorf and Roberts conveyed the corner property to James
Dundas in fee, subject to the ground-rent, and also to the restriction. In January, 1838, Dundas conveyed to Andrew D. Cash in
fee, said house and lot, subject to the ground-rent, and also to the
restriction. Prior to April 30, 1839, Henry had, as a matter of
courtesy merely, without any consideration, consented that Cash
should erect a dining-room on said lot eleven feet in height, but
refused to allow the restriction to be interfered with beyond th-e
building of the dining-room eleven instead of ten feet high.
Henry, by deed dated April 30, 1839, indorsed on Cash's deed
for the corner property, after reciting that Cash had with his consent, previously built a dining-room on the lot, of eleven feet in
height, granted to Cash in fee, in consideration of one dollar, the
right to continue and maintain the said dining-room of said height
forever. "Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall
be so construed, as in anywise to impair, prejudice, or affect the
condition and restriction in the said within indenture particularly
recited and set forth, in relation to building on the within described
lot."
"FMr. Henry's opinion was, clearly, that it would be a great
injury to the other property adjoining to the south, if the restriction on the corner lot was violated." The additional foot in height
to Cash's dining-room was not regarded as material, and as an act
of courtesy Mr. Henry permitted it.
Cash conveyed the corner property May 1, 1839, to Ashhurst,
subject to the ground-rent, and restriction "except so far as modified and changed by" the last recited deed. Ashhurst owned the
property at the time of Henry's death.
In August, 1847, Henry died, seised in fee of said ground-rent
of $225, and also of the lot, with a dwelling-house thereon erected
to the southward of and immediately adjoining the corner property.
By his will he devised said dwelling-house and lot adjoining the
corner, in trust with a power of sale. He also authorized his
31
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executors to assign and convey his ground-rents in payment of
legacies.
Said executors by deed dated August 14, 1848, granted and
assigned said ground-rent of $225, to Mrs. Martha H. Chambers
in fee, in part payment of a devise to her under the will.
In May, 1849, Ashhurst conveyed the said corner property, by
the description of "all that three-story brick messuage, with the
one-story back building or dining-room thereto attached, and the lot
of ground, &c., to John .Buddy in fee, subject to the ground-rent,
and also to said restriction.
The surviving trustee under Mr. Henry's will, by deed dated
April 7, 1857, conveyed said dwelling-house and lot, adjoining said
corner lot to the southward, to complainant.
In February, 1858, Buddy, conveyed said corner property, subject to said ground-rent and also to said restriction, to John L.
Martin, the defendant, in fee.
Mrs. Chambers died in March, 1860, seised in fee of said groundrent of $225, having first made her will, the executors named in
which, by virtue of certain powers therein given, granted and
assigned said ground-rent to John L. Martin, the defendant, in fee,
whereby the same merged and became extinguished.
The bill, after setting out the -title of the respective properties,
alleged that complainant, as the owner, by title from Alexander
Henry, of the dwelling-house and lot adjoining the said corner
premises on the south, was entitled to the full benefit and privilege
of said restriction; that his back-buildings face north, and the
maintenance of the restriction was absolutely necessary for proper
enjoyment of his property, since, if the restriction be infringed or
broken, the health and comfort of the occupiers of said property
will be irreparably injured; that, by means of the restriction, the
light and air have access from Locust street, across the corner lot,
to complainant's premises. That, on the western side of said tenfeet wide alley, the wall of the Musical Fund Hall rises to the
height of a three-story dwelling-house; and, unless the restriction
is enforced upon the corner lot, it may be built upon the full width
to its entire depth to said alley, and without limit as to height, and
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thus complainant's property be shut in, leaving only an arrow well
for access of light and air, and the health and comfort of the
occupants, and the property itself, be greatly injured; that it was
the intention of defendant to build on the corner lot, without regard
to the restriction, under pretence of a right so to do, and prayed
an injunction to restrain defendant, his agents, &c., from infringing
said restriction, and for general relief.
The answer admits the allegations of the bill as to the title to
said two lots of ground and dwelling-houses now vested in the
complainant and defendant respectively.
But alleged that in the deed from Henry to Drosddorf and
Roberts for the corner property, there is no remedy or penalty prescribed for breach of said condition, nor any covenant on the part
of the grantees to perform it; that said Alexander Henry laid out
the large lot mentioned in the bill prior to the conveyance to
Drosddorf and Roberts, according to a plan given in the answer;
that said Henry did not, by his will or otherwise, give and devise to
the trustees, to whom he devised the premises adjoining the corner,
any right, title, or interest, in or to the condition in thp deed to
Drosddorf and Roberts; that the grant and assignment from
Henry's executors to Mrs. Chambers conveyed the said ground-rent
of $225 to her, "together with the reversions and remainders of
the premises, and all the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim,
and demand whatsoever, which was of the said Alexander Henry, as
well at law as in equity, of, in, and to the same, and of, in, and to
the lot of ground whereout the said rent is issuing and payable ;"
that said surviving trustee did not in any way grant or convey to
complainant any right, title, or interest, in or to said condition in
the deed to Drosddorf and Roberts ; that the executors of Mrs.
Chambers, by their deed to the defendant, conveyed to him the said
ground-rent, "and the reversions and remainders thereof, and all
covenants for payment thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim, and demand whatsoever, which was of the
said Martha H. Chambers, at and immediately prior to the time of
her decease, of, in, and to the same, and of, in, and to the said lot
of ground whereon the same was so as aforesaid charged ;" denied
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that complainant is e-Atitled to any benefit or privilege of said
restriction in the deed to Drosddorf and Roberts; or that the
enforcing of said restriction is necessary for the proper enjoyment
of complainant's property, or that the health and comfort of its
occupants or the value of the property would be injured and
damaged, if the restriction be not maintained; and admitted that
-he intended to build without regard to said restriction, -as follows, to
wit: "At the rear end of said dwelling, and attached thereto, a
piazza, extending in height from the ground to the eave of the roof
of said dwelling, enclosed on the south side with a nine-inch brick
wall and open to the west, and extending about eight feet westward; and also, at the distance of about fifteen feet westward from
said dwelling, a back-building, to be connected with said dwelling
by a stairway on the side next to Locust street, and to be in width
from said Locust street nineteen feet four inches, and in depth westward forty-four feet, to the ten-feet wide alley, and nearly as high
as the eave of said dwelling, leaving on the south, along the entire
length of said back-building, a space of three feet two inches
between its face and his party line on the south, and a clear space,
between said back-building and complainant's back-building, of
eleven feet," and alleged that at the time of the deed to Drosddorf
and Roberts, that part of the City was almost exclusively ocupied
by dwellings ; that since then, places of business have been
advancing into that neighborhood, and he desired to improve his
property in such manner as to conform to advances of business,
that he might enjoy its first fruits, and not be deprived of them by
the diminution of its value as a mere place of residence.
It appeared, from the proofs taken before an examiner, that
complainant had known of the restriction before he purchased the
property adjoining the corner from the surviving trustee under
Henry's will; that the trustee had no doubt but that the purchaser
of that property would be entitled to the benefit of the restriction
upon the corner property; but at the same time was unwilling, as
the will made no mention of the restriction, and he was acting in
a fiduciary character only, to execute a deed containing an express
,grant of the benefit of the restriction ; that, in consequence of this
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unwillingness, complainant, at the joint expense of himself and
said trustee, obtained the opinion of eminent counsel that the purchaser would be entitled to the benefit of the restriction as appurtenant to the property, of which benefit he could not be deprived
by any act on the part of any other representative of Henry ; and
that upon this opinion complainant took his deed from the surviving
trustee, without any express grant of the benefit of the restriction.
A motion for a preliminary injunction upon the bill, affidavits,
and counter affidavits, having been denied prior to the filing of the
answer, the defendant immediately went on and erected a building
in violation of the restriction, after the intended plan set out in
his answer. When the case came up for hearing on bill, answer
and proofs, the bill was dismissed pro forma, without argument,
and the complainant took this appeal.
S.C. and S. . Perkins, for appellant.
The restriction must have been imposed for the benefit of the
property now held by complainant. There is no other purpose for
which it can be supposed it was intended. Complainant knew of
its existence, was careful to be assured of his right to it before purchasing; and its advantage must have entered into the consideration he paid. Defendant never paid for its release or extinguishment. The general terms of the release of the ground-rent must
be restricted by the recitals: Rapp vs. Bapp, 6 Barr, 48; Zirby vs.
Taylor, 6 John. Chant. 251; Jackson vs. Stackhouse, 6 Cowen,
122; Cole vs. Gibson, 1 Vesey, Senr. 504. It was the estate in
the ground-rent alone which became merged; and even if it be
conceded that the restriction is annexed to the estate in the rent it is
not merged. Preston on Merger, 454.
The clause imposing the restriction, notwithstanding the words
" upon condition," is not necessarily to be treated as a condition.
It is a covenant, or agreement; or if not a covenant, creates an
easement for the benefit of the adjoining property; and the only
property which it adjoins is that now owned by complainant. A
clause will never be construed as a condition, when its language can
be resolved into a covenant. Paschallvs. Pasmore, 15 P. S. R.,
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See also Cromwell's Case, 2 Co. 71, a; Touchstone, p. 122. Any words which import an agreement will make
a covenant, 3 Com. Dig. 263, Covenant A. 2. And see Hoyt vs.
Carter, 19 Barb. S. 0. Rep. 212. The complainant, even if unable
to bring an action of covenant, is yet entitled to the aid of a Court
of Equity to enforce the covenant or agreement made for the
benefit of the estate which he now owns. Blecker vs- Bingham, 3
Paige Ch. Rep. 246; Barrow vs. Richard, 8 Id. 351 ; Bronwer
vs. Jones, 23 Barb. S. C. Rep. 153; Tulk vs. Moxhay, 2 Phillips
Ch. Rep. 774; Biddle vs. Ash, 2 Ashmead, 221; Mann vs. Stephens, 15 Simons Ch. Rep. 377; Miller vs. .Hill, 3 Paige Ch.
Rep. 254; Whatman vs. Gibson, 9 Simons Ch. Rep. 196; Cole
vs. Sims, 23 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 584; Talmadge vs. East River
Bank, 2 Duer Rep. 614; -Hodsonvs. Coppard, 7 Jur. N. S. 11.
The interference of equity may be justified on the ground of
compelling specific execution of a contract. Scott vs. Burton, 2
Ashmead, 324; Barret vs. Blagrave, 5 Vesey, 555; Stuyvesant
vs. The Mayor &c. of New York, 11 Paige Ch. Rep. 414; 1
Smith's Leading Cases, 5 Amer. edit. Hare & Wallace's notes,
145.
The additional one foot in height allowed as a modification of
the restriction was not material; and in no way changes of affects
the restriction, or the relative position of the properties; -Duke of
Bedford vs. Trustees of the British Museum, 2 Myl. & K. 552,
so as to render the interference of equity for its enforcement
improper.
The defendant is estopped from denying the existence of the
restriction just as he found it in force when he purchased the corner property. It is a case of estoppel in pais. _Pickard vs. Sears,
6 Ad. & El. 469; Gregg vs. Wells, 9 Id. 97; Freeman vs. Cooke,
2 Exch. Rep. 663; Hamilton vs. Hamilton, 4 Barr, 194; 2
Smith's Leading Cas. 5th Amer. edit., 649, 653; Waters' Appeal,
35 P. S. R., 11 Casey, 523; Dezell vs. Odell, 7 Hill, N. Y. 219;
Wood vs. MeGuire, 15 Georgia, 202; McCravey vs. .emson, 19
Alabama, 430.
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Thos. S. Smithi and TFm. L. Hfirst, for defendant. The clause
in the deed from Henry to Drosddorf and Roberts is a condition.
It follows immediately after the grant without dependence on any
other sentence of the deed; the words are the words of the grantor,
and not of the grantees ; and are compulsory on the grantees not
to do an act; Co. Lit. 201, a. The condition is repugnant to the
grant, and therefore void. Smith on Real and Personal Property,
62 ; 2 Crabb's Law of Real Property, 795, sec. 2132; Littleton,
sec. 360; Co. Lit. 223, a; Bac. Abr. Title, 'Condition L.; Touchstone, 131-2. There was a reservation of a ground-rent; and a
covenant on the part of the grantor for quiet enjoyment so long as
the grantees paid the ground-rent.
If not void, the condition was extinguished by the verbal permission given to Cash to build in disregard of it. Smith, Real
and Pers. Property, 54; Touchstone, 159; Goodright vs. Davies,
Cowp. 803 ; Dickey vs. 31JcCullough, 2 W. & S. 88, c. The grant
by deed from Henry to Cash, was either an apportionment of the
condition, or a release of the condition upon condition, and in either
case the condition was wholly discharged. If an apportionment,
2 Crabb's Real Property, Title, Condition; Winter's Case, Dyer,
309; 1 Inst. 215, a; Knight's Case, 5 Co. 55, 58; Touchstone,
159; Dampor's Case, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 15; 1 Roll. Abr. 471 ;
Brummell vs. McPherson, 14 Yes. 173; Co. Lit. 297, b., 215, a.
If a release of condition upon condition, Co. Lit. 274, b. ; Com.
Dig. Title, Condition, a, 8; 2 Crabb's Real Property, 805; Dum-

por's Case.
If neither void nor released, the condition goes with the estate
in the rent, and the rent being extinguished upon its purchase by
the defendant who owned the lot out of which it was reserved, the
condition is also extinct by merger.
It was personal to the grantor. There is nothing in the line of
complainant's title giving him the benefit of the restriction. Nor
is there anything in the deed creating it, to show that it was
intended for the benefit of the adjoining property.
There was no general plan of building and mutual agreement and
obligation, as in Talmadge vs. East River Bank, and Cole vs.
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Sims. No specific appropriation of the condition for the benefit of
complainant's property as in Hills vs. Miller.
The defendant is a purchaser without notice of any intended
benefit to the adjoining property from the condition. Tul vs.
Moxhay; Hills vs. Miller; Hilner vs. Imbrie, 6 S. & R. 401,;
Frost vs. Beekman, 1 John. Ch. Rep. 298.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LOWRIE, C. .- In 1814, Drosddorf and Roberts bought the
corner lot from Alexander Henry subject to a perpetual rent, and
with -the condition written in this deed, that they, their heirs and
assigns, should not erect any building on the back part of it higher
than ten feet. Henry being then the owner of the lot adjoining on
the south. The corner lot afterwards passed successively to five
different owners, the last of whom is the defendant Martin, and in
all the deeds the same condition is repeated; so that Martin himself in 1858 purchased on these express terms. Of the adjoining
lot, Alexander Henry died seised, and in 1851, his testamentary
trustee conveyed it to the plaintiff Clark ; and the rent reserved
on the corner lot by Henry was purchased by Martin in 1860.
Our question is, has Clark as owner of the adjoining lot, any such
right to the condition or terms imposed upon Martin's title as entitles him to claim in equity that Martin shall be compelled to
observe them? We think he has.
In a proceeding in the common law form it would be necessary
to inquire into the form in which the right is reserved, in order to
decide whether it should be sued for ds a condition, or a covenant,
or as a simple contract; but in the equity form of proceeding we
inquire only into its substantial elements; what duty does it assure,
and to whom?
Here the duty of the defendant is so plain that one may read it
running; it is clearly inscribed on every link 'of the chain of his
title to the lot. He took his title expressly on the terms already
briefly mentioned. He was not to erect on the back part of his
lot any building higher than ten feet, afterwards changed to eleven.
To whom then does he owe the duty ? No one doubts that it is to
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the grantor who reserved or imposed the duty, and to his heirs and
assigns.
But did the grantor reserve this duty to himself his heirs and
assigns as a mere personal duty, and thus retain in himself, or
them, the vain right of saying that lot is not mine, but the owner
is subject to my pleasure in the mode of building upon it?
Common sense forbids this, and the law would not allow itself to
be troubled with such vain engagements. It is not pretended that
this restriction was intended for the benefit of the ground-rent
reserved by Henry. And such a pretence would be entirely unreasonable for a restriction that diminishes the value of the lot and of
the houses that may be erected on it, cannot increase the security
of the rent issuing out of it.
We have no other resource, therefore, than to attribute the
restriction to the purpose of benefiting the adjoining lot, then
owned by Henry.
Common sense cannot doubt its purpose, and thus it becomes
plain that the duty created by the condition and restriction is a
duty to the owner of the adjoining lot, whoever he might be.
Very plainly, also, it is a duty that admits the right of the owner
of the adjoining lot to have the privilege or appurtenance of light
and air over the defendant's lot, and that admits this to be so far
subject or servient to that, that the buildings on this must, for the
benefit of that, be so limited in height, according to the condition
inthe deeds.
So such stipulations are always regarded when a form of remedy
is selected and allowed, which can admit of treating the case according to the very substance of the contract.
The remedy asked for here is just such a one, under the law
authorizing the courts in equity form, to prevent or restrain "1the
commission or continuance of acts contrary to law and prejudicial
to the interests of the community or the rights of individuals."
And so abundant are the instances in the administration of equity
wherein this very duty has been specifically enforced, that a reference to the cases may very well stand instead of a discussion of
the question: 2 Ashmead, 221, 335 ; 2 Harris, 186 ; 3 Prige, 246,
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254; 2 Phillips, 774; 15 Simons, 377; 7 Jurist, (1861' Rolls
Court,) 11; 2 Mylor & R. 552; 11 Prige, 414; 8 id. 351;
2 iDuer, 614-23; Barbour, 153; 23 Law Reports, 401, (Whitney
vs. Union Railway Co., 1860, Superior Court of Mass.;) 23 Eng.
L. and Eq. R. 584; 9 Simons, 196.
It was objected at the argument that this remedy applies only as
a means of compelling an observance of the terms involved in a
general plan of lots ; and this element actually exists in about half
of the cases just cited; yet they are not decided on that consideration. It is not because a plan is deranged that the court interferes, but because rights are invaded, or about to be ; and this fact
may exist in a plan of two lots, as well as in one of two hundred.
The plan often furnishes the proof of the terms on which sales were
made; but the fact of the alleged terms is as effective when proved
by a single deed as when proved by a plan.
It is objected, also, that the restriction relied on here, is in the
form of a condition, and that it was released by the release of
part of it. But this, if true, in such a case, would apply only
where a forfeiture of the defendant's estate for a breach of the condition is demanded. Equity does not so treat the case where mere
obedience is demanded. And here, at the very time when part of
the right was released, the right, to the remainder was expressly
continued or renewed. The right is very clearly defined, and it is
no more inconsistent with the grant of the fee simple than any
other right of easement is, and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree
in his favor. The breach of the contract and the amount of injury
done are plainly sufficient for this: 12 Harris, 159.
It appears by the evidence that, since this suit was brought, the
defendant, in disregard of the suit, has *gone on and erected the
building. This was very wrong, and puts the court into a very
painful position.. Our decree in equity is. not so severe as a judgment at law would be in ejectment for a breach of a valid condition
in such a case, for it does not forfeit the house and lot: 8 Pick. 284.
But the abatement of part of a house is so unusual, and so seldom
that perso*ns put themselves into such a position as to make such a
decree necessary, that we have great reluctance in so decreeing, and
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have hopes that the parties may come to some reasonable terms.
However, our duty is very plain, and the defendant, by disregard
of his contract, and by recklessness in building, pending the suit,
has brought the evil on himself. Under the general relief clause,
the plaintiff can have a decree of abatement, without any amendment to his bill by reciting the fact of the erection pending the
action.
Let the decree be drawn in favor of the plaintiff, with costs.
The subject of the validity and method
of enforcing restrictions on the use of
real property which are generally contained ii building leases, and often in
freehold conveyances, is one of growing
importance, though it has not yet been
very extensively discussed in this country. That a great advantage not only
in comfort but in health is gained in
large cities, by the construction of
blocks of buildings on an uniform plan,
and with sufficient spaces devoted to the
supply of light and air, is beginning t6
impress itself forcibly on the public
mind. The exclusion from such localities of particular trades, which though
not technically nuisances, are often in
effect such, is almost equally to be
desired. The old fashioned way in
which villages straggled up into towns,
each man planting his house or his shop
where it best suited his caprice or his
convenience, has been found to result
in tortuous andcramped streets, with bad
ventilation and imperfect drainage, fruitful of endemic disease. To some extent
and in some places this is now remedied
by municipal regulation, but much must
be left to individual efforts, and to that
practical foresight which is the attendant
on private enterprise. There would certainly be great cause for regret if there
were any imperative doctrines of law
which precluded the use of such restrictions, as those to which we have referred, or confined them to a mere per-

sonal advantage, available only as between the original parties creating them.
At common law, unfortunately, there
were such doctrines, which, as a branch
of the rule that rights of action are not
assignable, would paralyze a large class
of restrictions. By the statute of 32
Henry VIII., no doubt, a considerable
extension of remedy was given, where
the qualification of ownership was expressed in the form of a covenant. But
the decisions on this statute present so
many technical refinements, as to what
are and what are not covenants "running with the land," and are so much
oecgpied with discussions about words
rather than things, that the real intentions of the parties are often disappointed. Besides, the statute does not,
in general, extend to conveyances in
fee simple, which, of itself, excludes
every important class of cases. See the
authorities discussed in the notes to
Spencer's Case, 1 Smith's Lead: Cases,
5 Am. Ed. 115. And the law still remains unchanged (except in one or two
states), in respect to conditions, i,
which form building restrictions are
often expressed, which, being in defeasance of the estAe, are construed with
the greatest strictness, while, at the
same time, they are held not to pass to
an assign, nor to be divisible or capable
of a partial dispensation: Dumpor's
Case, 1 Smith's Lead. Cases, 5 Am. Ed.
85, and notes.
When, however, we turn to the reme-
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dies afforded by a Court. of Equity, we
enter upon a very different order of
ideas. There, rights of action are, as a
general rule, held to be assignable for
a valuable consideration, as of course,
and without the help of any statute.
And the intention of the parties to the
instrument or transaction by which
these rights were created, so far as it
can be fairly gathered from the language
used, interpreted by thp light of surrounding circumstances, is looked at,
without regard to the technical effect
of particular words or phrases. Applying these principles to the matter in
hand, it is now settled, in England at
least, that wherever parties to a sale or
lease of real eitate agree that the property dealt with shall (in a reasonable
way) be burthened or affected in its
incidents or mode of use, for the benefit
of other property of the grantor or
lessor, this amounts to a contract which
equity will slecifically enforce, whether
it has been expressed in the shape of a
formal covenant, has been inverted into
a condition, or has been left to be discovered from the circumstances attending the transaction itself. Further, the
benefit of the restriction will pass on
the sale of the dominant tenement as an
easement, appurtenance, or incident of
ownership, unless it appears to be of a
purely personal character. And, in
like manner, a purchaser of the servient
tenement, with notice of the restriction,
will be held bound by the same duties
and obligations as those under whom
he claims; it being a familiar rule in
equiry that the engagements binding on
the conscience of the owner of property,
are equally so on tAose who succeed
him in title with a knowledge of their
existence. To the extent of those engagements, he and they are considered
in the light of trustees for those who are
entitled to their benefit: Rankin v.
Huskisson, 4 Sim. 13; Whatman v.

Gibson, 9 Id. 196; Sehreebner v. Reed,
10 Id. 9 ; Mann v. Stephens, 15 Id. 397 ;
Tulk v. Moxhay, 11 Beav. 571; 2 Phill.
774; Patching v. Dobbins, Kay 1; Cole
v. Sims, Id. 56; 5 De Gex, M. & G. 1;
Hudson v. Coppard, 29 Bear. 4; Piggott v. Stratton, 1 De Gex, Fish. &
Jones 38.
That these conclusions are the natural
consequence of established doctrines,
cannot be denied; yet it must be conceded, on the other hand, that it is only
recently that they have acquired this
definite shape. The earlier equity decisions will be found generally to discuss questions of this kind on the basis
of Spencer's Case, and the other authorities at law. In Holmes v. Buckley, 1
Eq. Cas., Abr. 27 (A. D. 1691), there
had been a grant in fee of a watercourse over certain land, *ith a covenant on the part of the grantor, for his
heirs and assigns to cleanse the watercourse from time to time. This covenant was enforced in equity by an
assignee of the watercourse against an
assignee of the land, on the ground that
it was one running with the land, which,
however, would seem to be an error.
The case of the City of London vs. Richmond, 2 Vern. 421 (A. D. 1701), was one
where a bill to compel the payment of
rent reserved on a lease of waterpower,
was sustained against an assignee, on
the ground, it would seem, that the
subject of the lease being an incorporeal hereditament, there was no privity
of estate, and, therefore, no remedy at
law, but the inevitable Spencer's Case
was cited. On the other hand, in
Chandos vs. Brownlow, 2 Ridw. P. C.
416 (A. D. 1791), the question arose on
a covenant for renewal of a lease, and
the Lord Chancellor of Ireland laid it
down positively that no relief could be
given in equity on a covenant which
did not bind the land at law. The decision of the House of Lords, however,
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was against his opinion on the whole
case, whether on this, or on other
grounds which were involved, does not
appear. In Barret vs. Blagrave, 5 Ves.
Jr. 555 (A. n. 1800), an injunction was

granted against an under tenant for a
violation of a covenant in the original
lease, against carrying on a particular
business on the demised premises,
though no action at law would lie in
such case. The matter, however, was
not argued for the defendant. Then in
Bedford vs. Trustees of the British Museum, 2 M. & K. 552 (A. D. 1822), Lord
Eldon, putting aside any question as to
the validity of the particular covenant
at law, based his decision, which was
the refusal of an injunction, on general
grounds of equity; and he adopts the
same mode of dealing with the subject
in Roper vs. Williams, 1 T. & R. 18
(A. D. 1822), a very similar case. It
cannot be said that these two decisions
are direct authorities in favor of the
doctrines which we have above stated
to be now established; but, by changing the plane of discussion from law to
equity, they undoubtedly prepared the
way for it. Next followed the well
known case of Keppel vs. Bailey, 2 M.
& K. 517 (A. D. 1834), in which Lord
Brougham went over the whole topic of
covenants running with the land, in a
manner to exhibit very strongly his
learning, industry, and ability, and, at
the same time (with due respect be it
said), his entire misconception of the
elemental principles of equity. After
a review of the authorities, he held,
perhaps correctly, that the covenant in
question there did not bind the assignee
at law, and, therefore, he shortly decided, did not bind him in equity.
Notice to a purchaser of such a covenant, amounted to nothing, he said, for
it was only notice of what could not
affect him! Even if his conclusion

were right, his reasoning would have
destroyed half the jurisdiction of Chancery. To enforce against purchasers
with notice, trusts and contracts which
could not possibly affect them at law,
is its especial province. The assignee
of a simple contract even, could not sue
the debtor in assumpsit; but, if the
latter paid the assignor, after notice,
his chance in a Court of Equity would
be a poor one. The truth is, that Lord
Brougham confounded the case of a
covenant void ab initto, with one which,
valid in itself, was simply incapable at
law of assignment, as respects its
benefit or its burthen. This is plain,
because the drift of his main argument
is that, to encourage the assignability
of covenants of this nature, would lead
to "bold attempts to create new kinds
of liability and new species of estate."
To which the answer is, that, of course,
there must be some limit put to the
validity of agreements affecting land;
but that is no reason why a covenant
which is perfectly good between A. and
B., shall not be enforced as between C.
and D., their respective assignees. To
say that X., who has taken a conveyance of a lot of ground under a restriction against dangerous or offensive
trades, can be held to the letter of his
bargain, however long he may live; yet,
that if he sell it at once to Y., he may
use it for a powder-mill, or knacker's
yard, if he likes, is simply absurd.
This decision in Keppel vs. Bailey,
seems to have been. considered as a
harmless eccentricity, for the Vice-Chancellor of England, and the Master of the
Rolls, were quite .disregardful of it in
the subsequent cases of Whatman vs.
Gibson, Schreebner vs. Read, Mann vs.
Stephens, and Tulk vs. Moxhay, before
cited; and in this last case, on appeal,
it was summarily disposed of by Lord
Cottenham, who observed, in effect, that
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Lord Brougham could not have meant
what he said there, but that if he did he
could not coincide with him. Tulk vs.
Moxhay was the case of a conveyance
in fee of a lot of ground, with a covenant
by the grantee only to use as a private
square, which was enforced against a
purchaser with notice. The Lord Chancellor said the question was not "whether the covenant ran with the land,
but whether a party shall be permitted
to use the land in a manner inconsistent
with the contract efitered into by his
vendor, and with notice of which he
purchased ;" which he answers at once
in the negative, saying: "If an equity
is attached to the property by the owner,
no one purchasing with notice of that
equity can stand in a different situation
from the party from whom he purchased."
This was followed by Vice-Chancellor
Wood in Patching vs. Dobbins and Cole
vs. Sims, ut supra, and by the Equity
Court of Appeal, on an appeal in this
last case. This may be considered to
set this branch of the subject at rest.
Another objection to covenants and
restrictions of this character, independent of that of their assignability, which
has been unsuccessfully urged in most
of the cases cited, is, that, they lead to a
perpetuity, and are in restraint of trade.
But this was admitted even in Keppel
vs. Barley not to be tenable, was expressly overruled in Tulk vs. Moxhay,
Cole vs. Sims, and Hodson vs. Coppard t
it supra, which last was the case of a
conveyance in fee, with a covenant that
certain trades should not be carried on
on the premises.
So far, then, the 'principal English
authorities. In this country, the decisions in New York arrive at the same
result, though not, perhaps, with the
same clearness and precision. In Hill
vs. Miller, 3 Paige, 254, and Trustees
of Watertown vs. Cowen, 4 Id. 510, it

was held by the Chancellor that a covenant, or even a collateral agreement on
the sale of land in fee, not to build on a
particular part of the lot conveyed,
would be enforced in equity in favor of
a sub-assignee against a purchaser with
notice, on the ground that an easement
or privilege was thereby created which
ran with the land, and -was capable of
division. So in Barrow vs. Richards, 8
Paige, 851, a similar covenant against
the carrying on offensive trades was
decided to be binding even as against a
previous purchaser from the same vendor. And in Tallmadge vs. East River
Bank, 2 Duer, 614, specific performance
of a parol agreement between purchasers
of adjoining lots, not to build beyond a
certain line, having been acted on, was
decreed against one who had violated it.
That the agreement is expressed in the
deed in the strict form of a condition at
law, is no reason why specific performance should not be compelled: Aiken vs.
Albany, Vermont & Canada Railroad,
26 Barb. 289. In Pennsylvania, also, it
has been held that an independent parol
engagement between a vendor and
vendee, that the buildings on a particular lot, of which part was sold,
should be restricted.to a certain frontage
line, would bind the land: Scott vs.
Burton, 2 Ashm. 312; but in this case
relief was refused against a purchaser
without notice. Some of these cases,
unfortunately, do not sufficiently discriminate between the grounds of decision at law and in , quity on this subject, and use expressions borrowed from
the rules laid down in Spencer's Case,
which are not very accurately applied.
See the observations in the American
note to Spencer's Case, ut supra. An
expansion of remedy which may be very
wise in the one tribunal is not always
so in the other; for it must be remembered, for the protection of assignees of
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the land, that the defence of "purchaser
without notice" is not available at law.
In a recent case in Massachusetts,
which arose on a restriction contained
in a conveyance of a building lot, against
the use of the premises for any nauseous
or offensive trade, ,the later English.
doctrine was expressly followed and
applied: Whitney vs. Union Railway
Co., 23 Bost. L. R. 401. The language
of the learned judge who delivered the
opinion of the court, places the matter
iniato
strictions in equity against purchasers
r
with notice. But a later case of Badger
vs. Boardman, 24 Bost. L. R. 303, which
was also in equity, is not so satisfactory,
and shows a tendency to return to the
old common law doctrines. There a
grantor conveyed part of a larger lot of
ground, with a restriction against erecting any building thereon above a certain
height. This was held to be a purely
personal covenant, and not to pass to an
assignee of the remaining land, there
being, in the opinion of the court, no
language in the deeds under which the
parties claimed from which it could be
fairly inferred that this restriction was
intended to enure to the benefit of the
estate owned by the plaintiffs, who as
assignees were seeking to enforce the
covenant,

of this character to operate only for his
own personal benefit, and not for that
of the land retained by him. Why
should he? As it to that extent depreciates in value what he is selling, it is
equivalent to so much purchase-money
retained; and it would be a foolish bargain, indeed, to sacrifice a distinct,
present advantage, for the chance of
being bought off for a small sum at a
future day, when he has parted with
his interest. Nor is it more reasonable
a moe contins
t us tat
suppose that such a remote contingency enters into the calculation of the
vendee, particularly as it is quite probable that, if it should ever happen, it
would enure to the benefit of some
grantee of his own, not to himself.
And it would be equally foolish for him
to add to his purchase-money upon so
fragile a hope. To import such a
meaning into a contract of this nature,
would turn it so far into a mere aleatory
one, the more to be discouraged, because
it would tend to mislead and injure subpurchasers of the grantor. A Court of
Equlty, therefore, applying the covenant or condition to the facts of the
case, and not merely parsing the words
in which it is expressed, as the old common law judges did, must presume thatit was stipulated by the grantor, for the
benefit of his adjoining property. This
being so, it would pass, on a sale of the

This last decision, as it is in conflict
with that which is the occasion of this
note, and at variance with the views
therein expressed, perhaps requires a
few words of respectful comment.
There may have been something in the
facts of the case, which would justify
the conclusion arrived at; but it would
seem to us, with great deference, that
the argument, from the silence of the
deeds on the subject, ought to have
been reversed. It is not reasonable to
suppose that a grantor, unless he says
so in express terms, means a restriction

latter, to the purchaser, without any
express words in the conveyance, as a
mere equitable incident or appurtenance, as, indeed, all subsidiary rights,
easements, or privileges connected with
property necessarily do, if nothing is
said to the contrary.
Having now sketched the history and
development of the doctrine of courts
of equity on the general subject of the
principal case, there are some observations on its practical operation, and tire
limits within which it ought to be confined, which it would be desirable to
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make, as it is obvious, if not carefully
guarded, it might hereafter lead to some
inconvenient consequences; but we have
not sufficient space for the purpose.
There is one suggestion, however, which
we may throw out in conclusion, for
what it may be worth. The common
law rule, as corrected by the statute of
32 Henry VIIL, confined the assignability of covenants with a grantor of
land, to cases where he had some reversionary title left in himself. There is
no doubt that there was much practical
wisdom in this, for if burthens on real
estate, perhaps capriciously or foolishly
created, could be enforced in perpetuum,
in favor of persons who had no interest
to be protected or advantaged thereby,
the inconvenience and detriment to the
community at large would be very great.
But the older lawyers looked on a piece
of land only as an isolated fact, subdivisible, in point of ownership, into particular estates, with a reversion or
remainder, but having no definite juridical relation with any other piece of
land. At the present day, in a more
complicated organization of society, it
often happens that a man who sells a
small lot of land out of a larger one,
lias as great an interest to protect in
that which remains in him, as he could
have upon any technical reversion;
much greater, indeed, than in that dependant on I lease for a thousand years,
to which covenants may unquestionably
be attached. He has, in fact, a sort of
material reversion. Is it not possible,
then, from this point of view, to adapt

the old rules of law to their changed
circumstances, so as to reconcile, in
some degree, the conflicting decisions
at law and in equity ? Now a man may
obtain an injunction, Where he could
not bring an action, or could at any
rate recover only nominal damages.
Indeed, for most practical purposes, the
ingenious logic and abstruse learning
of Spencer's Case, must hereafter be of
small importance. Yet it would be a
pity to lose sight of the principles which
lie behind them, and to swing so far in
the opposite direction as to obliterate
all distinction between real and personal
covenants. Would it not be well to
preserve the essence and reason of that
distinction, by enlarging, if it could be
done, the doctrines of the earlier cases,
so as to comprehend, not merely reversions proper, but that very real, though
still unrecognised interest, which, as we
have said, a grantor retains in the material subdivisions of his land? This,
perhaps, could not be done at law, without the aid of a statute, but it might
prove to a Chancellor a safer and readier
clue to determine the character of a
covenant or condition, than any general
notions of equity, which must vary
much with individual judges. It is
always better, where it is possible, to
follow the analogy of established principles, where they have ceased to be
directly applicable, than to elaborate a
new theory, which must require a long
time, and involve much conflict of decision, before it can -be condensed into a
practical system of rules.
R. w.

